**Contention 1** is the Reptilian Illuminati

Resource extraction is facilitated by a reptilian Illuminati conspiracy to enslave the world and destroy the environment, culminating in extinction.

**Sacks 12** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**As the world continues to go down the road of self-destruction, we, the enslaved humanoids** of planet Earth**, are** slowly realising that we are **at a crossroads in history**. War, economic collapse, rampant militarism, and a political culture of fear is overshadowed by the environmental crisis. Cementing the hold of the 1% on our lives, global **climate change is a deliberate strategy to undermine our liberation movement by killing off our** most rebellious and **most vulnerable**. Yet, 2011 was the year of the humanoid awakening against our enslavement and oppression at the hands of the 1%. From Tunisia to Greece to Chile to New York, we rose up to assert our collective humanity. It is important to note that there are two kinds of dictatorships. One is an overt dictatorship, such as that of Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt respectively. The other is liberal democracy. As British political philosopher David Icke explains, “that is the ultimate control, because people do not rebel against not being free when they think they are”. But it seems that even within liberal democracies, **the masses are beginning to understand that they remain in chains**. Still, despite the tens of millions who took to the streets last year, very few of us have a rigorous analysis of who the 1% are and how an increasingly large number of **the world's elite are part of a hidden conspiracy to leave our planet in shambles after extracting all its resources and laying waste to the environment**. Only those who have nothing to lose would dare risk destroying Earth as we know it, just to get at its raw materials. Bloodlines An increased body of **scholarly research suggests that there are two** primary **bloodlines that control our planet: The Rothschilds and** the **Windsor dynasties.** What began within the construction and maintenance of the banking system oligarchy has spread to other areas of control, including government, manufacturing and technology. For instance, **the prestigious Bush family** line, when traced back, **originates within the Windsor dynasty.** In fact, it has been shown that **33** of the 44 **US presidents are related to Charlemagne and** England's **Edward III, both of whom are part of this bloodline.** Only the gullible cry coincidence here. More and more people, especially those involved in the Occupy movement are discovering the bloodlines' explicit role in fermenting the recent financial crisis. Insurgent political theories about the so-called Illuminati conspiracy continue to gain credence because these protests have exposed the true nature of the 1%. More than just a metaphor, such concepts provide a clear and undeniable model to account for our geo-political malaise. If we are prepared to follow this line of inquiry to its end, as I propose we must, one disturbing truth becomes clear: **The Illuminati, the** conspiratorial **organisation that has controlled the world since** at least **the 18th century, is** in fact **a** three-dimensional **proxy group for the reptilian bloodline**, a group of human-like reptoids from the constellation Draco in the lower fourth-dimension. The Reptilians This crucial information has been unearthed by numerous investigators over the past few years. Most prominently, Icke, has revealed through exhaustive interviews with Christine Fitzgerald, close friend of **Diana of Wales**, that the people's princess **was** actually **killed because she had discovered the truth about the Windsors** dynasty**: that they are actually shape-shifting reptoids** involved in, amongst other things, the global drug trade. Likewise, hip hop revolutionary **Tupac** Shakur, **who also discovered the truth** behind the Reptilian Illuminati bloodlines, **was assassinated by East Coast Reptilians connected to** the villainous hip venture capitalist Sean Combs aka Puff Daddy / **P Diddy** / Diddy Dirty Money, etc. (Like the Devil in the Christian Bible, the reptoids trade in many names. A cultural overlap that bears more exhaustive study than permitted here).

Reptilian domination outweighs extinction. It’s a face worse than death.

**Bartley 4** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

The reptilians make full use of what American Military War Colleges refer to as a "Force Multiplier." In this case, it is mayhem, sexual predation, ritual murder and Genocide by PROXY. **Rather than go to the trouble of manifesting in full physical density and having to individually rape, torture and perpetrate genocide upon countless humans,** the **reptilians manipulate** individual humans as well as **entire societies** and nations **to do the work for them.** This is an important point to understand. The reptilians will manipulate individual males into becoming serial sex offenders and serial murderers and on a macro level, they will inculcate notions of racial purity and racial superiority into entire cultures which then serves as the basis and justification for those same cultures to perpetrate Genocide upon other races and societies deemed "inferior" or "sub-human." If we as a Species ever hope to move beyond the control of the draco-reptilian overlords, we must first recognize the massive deception that has been foisted upon us. We must understand that notions of **racial purity and racial superiority are inherently reptilian modalities**. These reptilian modalities than **[that] provide the justification for** individuals and **entire cultures to** perpetrate mayhem and **slaughter** upon **their fellow humans.** This serves to further the reptilian's ultimate goal of a Global Tyranny because often as not United Nations troops become embroiled in the various regional conflicts. Those of us within the research community must be willing to point out the absurd fallacies of the reptilian propagandist and New Age Globalist. Starry eyed New Agers display the same kind of misplaced enthusiasm that so many young intellectual Communists displayed in the 1920's and 1930's during the worst of the Bolshevik Revolution's excesses. We must come to grips with the fact that **the worst atrocities** perpetrated by humans **throughout history** has **[have] been the** end **result of Reptilian manipulation.**

# FW

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90**[[3]](#footnote-3)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

Second, reductionism.

Brain studies prove personal identity doesn’t exist. **Parfit 84** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[5]](#footnote-5)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

And third, universalizability justifies util. **Singer 93**[[6]](#footnote-6)

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. **In accepting that ethical judgments must be** made from a **universal** point of view, **I am accepting that my own interests cannot,** simply because they are my interests, **count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my** very natural **concern that my own interests be looked after must**, when I think ethically, **be extended to** the interests of **others.** Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. **This requires me to weigh** up **all** these **interests and** adopt the course of action most likely to **maximize the interests of those affected.**

Morality must take the form of a universal rule. **Singer 09** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**When I prescribe something**, using moral language, my prescription **[it] commits me to a** substantive **moral judgment about all** relevantly **similar cases. This includes hypothetical cases in which I am in a different position from my actual one. So to make a moral judgment, I must put myself** in the position of the other person affected by my proposed action – or to be more precise, **in the position of *all* those affected** by my action. Whether I can accept the judgment – that is, whether I can prescribe it universally – will then depend on whether I could accept it if I had to live the lives of all those affected by the action.

Thus, I affirm that developing countries should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction.

# Conspiracy Good

My interpretation is that the neg must defend that resource extraction is good assuming the Reptilian Illuminati rule the world.

Imagining conspiracy theories is good. 6 reasons.

First, conspiracy theories reveal the true nature of the world, making them epistemically superior.

**Pigden 7** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

But what is the status of these epistemic "oughts"? Are they categorical imperatives (Requirements of Reason) or hypothetical imperatives pointing out the means to achieve some widely shared but intellectually optional end, such as achieving an adequate understanding of the world? I incline to the latter view, though I suspect it would be a difficult business to specify the ends to which a respectable epistemic "ought" prescribes the means. But **whatever the precise status of epistemic "oughts", the claim that we rationally ought to adopt a belief-forming strategy** (such as not believing in or not enquiring into conspiracy theories), **would** appear to **presuppose that the strategy** in question **is conducive to truth** and the avoidance of error, at least under a wide range of circumstances. Thus the rationale for the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism is that it is more likely to get it right or less likely to get it wrong than its epistemic rivals. It rests on the presumption that conspiracy theories are unlikely to be true, so unlikely that they are generally not worth discussing. Indeed, it requires something stronger than the simple assumption that conspiracy theories as such are unlikely to be true. The space of possible theories is large; the space of true theories, small. **But** it would be [End Page 221] silly to conclude from this that we ought to abstain from theorizing to avoid the risk of error. The fact that theories in general are more likely to be false than true does not mean that we should give up theorizing or enquiring into theories. By the same token, **the fact that conspiracy theories are more likely** to be **false** than true **does not mean that we should give up conspiracy theorizing** or enquiring into conspiracy theories. For that to be a sensible strategy **we would have to suppose that conspiracy theories were** much **more likely to be false than** their **non-conspiratorial rivals**. And since he seems to think that we ought not to believe or enquire into conspiracy theories, that is, presumably, the opinion of Tony Blair and his allies amongst the punditocracy. 2. the Conventional Wisdom and Its Consequences: History is Bunk But if **a conspiracy theory** is simply a theory that **posits** a conspiracy – **a secret plan on the part of some group to influence events** by partly secret means – and if a conspiracy theorist is someone who subscribes to a conspiracy theory, then the conventional wisdom itself is not just suspect, but obviously absurd. A theory, in my book, is a more or less organized body of propositions designed to explain some alleged facts. Theories can be true or false, well or badly confirmed, and when they are sufficiently well-confirmed, they can rise to the dignity of knowledge. Indeed in common parlance we can even talk about proving theories, though this is a usage that would shock true Popperians. Thus to call something a theory is not to suggest that it is tentative, speculative or unproven, though many theories are, of course, tentative, speculative or unproven. Now, if a conspiracy theory is simply a theory that posits a conspiracy, then **every politically and historically literate person is a big-time conspiracy theorist**, since every such person subscribes to a vast range of conspiracy theories. That is, historically literate people believe organized bodies of propositions that explain alleged facts by positing conspiracies. For there are many facts that admit of no non-conspiratorial explanation and many conspiracy theories that are sufficiently well-established to qualify as knowledge. **It is difficult**, if not impossible, **to mount a coup without conspiring**, a point that is evident to all. Hence **anyone who believes there are** such things as **coups must subscribe to** a set of **conspiracy theories** however vague. Although some assassinations are due to "lone gunmen" many are group efforts, and the efforts of those groups are usually planned in secret. (Had the plans of Brutus and Cassius been public, Caesar could have avoided the Senate House or arrested the potential murderers before they struck.) Thus **anyone who knows** anything **about the Ides of March or** the **assassinations of** Archduke Franz **Ferdinand or** the **Tsar Alexander** II **is bound to subscribe to a conspiracy theory**, and hence to be a conspiracy theorist. But coups and assassinations are not even the half of it. **Disappearances are usually conspiratorial** affairs, since if you want to disappear someone, you had better not let them know when you are coming. Of course, it can add to the fun if you let your victims know, in a general way, that somebody is out to get them (and many goons [End Page 222] indulge this pleasure with threatening phone calls and other such "warnings"), but if you are a member of a goon squad, it is a good idea to conceal your identity as well as your precise plans. And if you are organizing a campaign of disappearances, it is well to keep your activities secret. After all, picking up your political opponents and having them jailed, tortured or executed is generally regarded as not quite nice, particularly for Presidents and Prime Ministers. And you can never be quite sure that some tedious do-gooder from the International Criminal Court won't catch up with you in the end. Much of the same considerations apply if you plan to clean up the city by butchering the local street kids in Brazil, Columbia or Honduras. Indeed, **mass killings** generally **are often planned and** partly **executed in secret**, the Holocaust being the supreme example, though one might also cite Stalin's purges. (It is strange to suppose the massacre of millions of people could be shrouded in secrecy but that is the way it was. Hannah **Arendt**, a Jewish activist with a passionate interest in politics, and as well informed as a private person was likely to be, **did not hear about** "**Auschwitz**" – by which, I presume she means the Nazi extermination program generally – **until 1943, and did not regard it as a proven fact until six months later** (Arendt 2000, 13).) If, like the "Young Marshal", Zhang Xueliang, in X'ian 1937, you plan to kidnap the Head of State with a view to coercing him into changing his policy (Fenby 2003, 1–18), you had better not let him know in advance, and the operation had better be begun in secret to maximize the chance of success. Even at the everyday level of democratic politics, conspiracies are not uncommon. If my party leader is trailing in the polls and I am planning a leadership "spill", I had best not let her know until I have a substantial number of MPs behind me. There is usually a good deal of secret plotting and furtive feeling out of potential supporters before a leadership challenge erupts into the open. In many countries **it is not unknown for politicians** and state officials **to take bribes and misappropriate public funds**. For obvious reasons, **these activities are** usually planned and executed in **secret**. Thus **if you believe in such things you must be a conspiracy theorist** of sorts**, even if you are hazy about the details**. Even in the small change of commercial life, conspiracies abound, a point acknowledged by Adam Smith, whose belief in the invisible hand of the market did not entail skepticism about the invisible hands of individual conspirators: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices" (Smith 1981, 135). "Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this [actual] rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution" (84). But I need not belabor a point that I have argued at length elsewhere.7 History and the nightly news (not to mention common sense) all tell the same tale: people often conspire. **Hence there is no reason to think that** theories that postulate **conspiracies are** much **more likely** to be **false than theories that explain the same events without** the aid of **conspiracies**. Indeed **there are many events for which there is no sane non-conspiratorial** [End Page 223] **explanation**. The Young Marshal's men did not individually decide without prior consultation to kidnap Chiang that day at X'ian in 1937, and if Mary Queen of Scots did not conspire to murder Lord Darnley at Kirk o' Fields in 1567, then somebody else did.

Second, students must learn about conspiracy theories. This is key to critical thinking and democracy. Rejecting conspiracy theories is empirically self-defeating.

**Carnell 10** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

In our modern lives we only have access to tiny slivers of information. **Where the government is concerned,** that sliver becomes increasingly narrower as **information is usually redacted for "security"** reasons. All this prompts the question; **why do we follow the government**'s or the corporation's conclusions **in lockstep** given the massive amount of information that we just don't know**?** Even worse, we all fall in love and in line with the narrative we create using our ideas, and- inevitably -- our actions follow our most dominant narratives. Many of us never challenge the narratives that we write to fit our own perspective. If we did, we'd find that one narrative is not necessarily any more or less true than any other. But where conspiracy theories are concerned, **most people are eager to mock those who adopt an outlook which** drastically **diverges from** the prevailing meaning ascribed by **the national mob.** It follows that the **marginalization of conspiracy theorists is the marginalization of ideas**. Somewhere along the way in America we began to discount ideas which were out of line with the majority's thinking. The same Republicans who don't believe in hate crimes because they regulate and punish people for the thoughts behind their actions condescendingly lord themselves over the domain of relevant thought when they dismiss conspiracy theorists as loons and crazies. But again, how can you know what's true if you don't know what's false? Rightly or wrongly, many **conspiracy theorists are** among a narrowing group of **critical thinkers.** Where conspiracy theorists diverge from ordinary thinkers is in their cognitive process; they look closely at what they don't know and build a theory around that vast emptiness while more mainstream minds build theories around the little they do know. **Conspiracy thinkers understand that what they don't know can be more relevant**, and more impactful, than what they do know. They listen to the silence. They hear what's not being said. **They are**, in a word -- **skeptics**. And in this era of imaginary WMD's, where handouts to the insurance companies masquerade as health care reform, skeptics are **essential to** the functioning of **our democracy.** I would go even further to suggest that **it would be** a **net positive if schools offered classes in conspiratorial thinking where students would** be required to **create as many scenarios as possible to explain how a particular event could've unfolded.** The more flexible and nimble a mind, the better. Followers don't grow up to become investigative reporters or creatives. **To teach people to cling to sameness in** the depth and variety of **their ideas encourages complacency and** recycles **drone-like behavior. Take** for example **Peter Schiff who**, in the days, months, and years **leading up to the** current **mortgage crisis** and recession that followed, **was sounding the alarm** bell for anyone who'd listen. **Schiff**, President of Euro Pacific Capital, **was ridiculed by** market cheerleaders on **Fox and CNBC as** -- you guessed it -- **a conspirator** and a dangerously pessimistic thinker. They mocked him, asking him such inconsequential and condescending questions as "are you fun at parties?" or "do you carry blades to cut your own wrist?" **Schiff turned out to be right**. The peanut gallery was wrong. **Knowing that most people are wrong most of the time creates mental space for alternative theories**. Going along to get along, or worse, shouting down those who do not share your sense that a dynamic universe produces a set of human events which are utterly predictable, shrinks human thought. And as evidenced by Peter Schiff, sometimes a small, quiet prediction grows into a big and dangerous truth. You'll never notice the tipping point though if you've spent the vast majority of your time and intellectual energy jeering those whose charge it is to warn you.

Third, conspiracy theories are key to challenging human rights abuses, and rational agents have a right to conspiracies. **Pigden 7** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

**Most political crimes**, from disappearances and illegal bombing campaigns down to breaking peaceniks' noses or burglarizing the campaign headquarters of [End Page 225] the opposition party,9 **are the products of conspiracy**. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories that posit conspiracies, then if we adopted **the principle that we should not believe and** should not **investigate conspiracy theories**, we could not hold anyone responsible for such crimes. For to do so would be to accept some conspiracy theory or other. This would be an epistemic disaster, since our understanding of the political scene would dissolve in a mist of skepticism broken by islands of obvious fact. We could believe in the dead bodies but not that anyone had conspired to kill them; believe in the missing money, but not in the felonious theft. And it would a political disaster, since it **would confer immunity on** political criminals of all sorts, from the **perpetrators of genocide** down to bribe-taking congressmen. We could not punish people for crimes that we were not entitled to believe in or investigate. Thus it would be both politically and epistemically irrational to adopt the strategy of not believing in and not investigating conspiracy theories. So the conventional wisdom is wrong, and it is not the case that we ought not to believe and ought not to investigate such theories. **When it comes to conspiracy theories, we are within our rights as rational beings not only to investigate them, but** actually **to believe in them, if that is what the evidence suggests.** Again it is worth stressing just how catastrophic the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be if we applied it consistently, rather than using it from time to time to get out of political difficulties or to rubbish allegations that we find inconvenient. To begin with, the political world would be largely unintelligible. **We would be** officially **debarred from understanding** coups, or the **crimes of terrorists as intentional actions, since** in both cases **the intentions** behind the overt acts **are formulated in secret**. Hence they cannot be understood as intentional acts without resorting to conspiracy. We could all acknowledge that the bombs had gone off, but we could not suppose that someone had planted them, since that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that two planes had hit the Twin Towers, but we could not allow ourselves to suppose they had been hijacked and deliberately crashed, since that could not have happened without a conspiracy. The nightly news would be bobbing with islands of unintelligibility, since we would be officially debarred from understanding any action involving secret plans. (I defy anyone to make sense of recent events in Iraq without taking account of the orgy of plotting that undoubtedly goes on. Death squads don't advertise their plans, neither do guerillas, gangsters, terrorists or devious politicians.) We would be allowed to understand natural phenomena and open actions, openly arrived at. And we might even treat ourselves to unintended consequences provided these did not involve secret plotting. But we would be officially blind to covert actions and secret plans. This would not quite be epistemic suicide, since there are some events within the political sphere that we would be allowed to understand. But to adopt the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation and hence not a rational thing to do. But epistemically disastrous as conspiratorial skepticism would be, its political consequences would be catastrophic. For when it comes to conspiracy we would [End Page 226] be both officially blind and officially incurious. Under this regime, Woodward and Bernstein would not have been allowed to investigate Watergate, and even if they had, nobody would have been rationally entitled to believe their results. Nixon would have gotten away with his crimes. For if conspiracy theories were taboo, there could be no question of impeaching the President for "high crimes and misdemeanors", since most of those high crimes and misdemeanors were planned and executed in secret. The career of an investigative journalist like Seymour Hersh would stand condemned as one long exercise in irrationality since investigative journalism largely consists of investigating conspiracies and exposing them to the public gaze. If it is irrational to check out conspiracy theories, then the investigative part is a crime against reason, and if it is irrational to believe them, then the journalistic part is a crime against reason too, since it often consists in writing up conspiracy theories so as to encourage belief in the reader. **One of the biggest problems with human rights abuses is impunity. Because** the **goons** and their masters **can usually get away with murder or worse,**10**they have no** compelling **reason to** cease and **desist**. But since most human rights abuses are the products of conspiracy, **if we adopted the strategy of neither investigating nor believing conspiracy theories, impunity would become rationally sacrosanct.** We could not investigate human rights abuses since, for the most part, this involves investigating conspiracy theories, and even if we could, we could not condemn their perpetrators, since to do that we would have to accept a conspiracy theory. Conspiratorial skepticism would provide the torturers and killers with a charter of impunity since **it would become an epistemic no-no to shine a light into** the **dark places where they commit their crimes.** Terrorists too would be immune from investigation, let alone conviction, since their crimes are usually planned in secret. More generally, it is a platitude of liberal democracy that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. At least part of what this means is that we must beware of power-hungry politicians conspiring to deprive us of our liberties. But if we were not allowed to investigate conspiracy theories then our vigilance would be confined to the public actions of politicians rather than their secret plans. We would have become officially blind to some of the most serious threats to liberty. And even if we somehow discovered such a conspiracy we would not be allowed to act on that discovery, since we could not act on a theory we had debarred ourselves from believing. According to Edmund Burke, "There is no safety for honest men except by believing all possible evil of evil men." But if the conventional wisdom is correct, we should not believe in the evil of evil men unless that evil is out in the open! Thus **if you hate the freedoms of a democratic society, you should cultivate the opinion that conspiracy theories are unbelievable**. Conversely, if you want to strike a blow for liberty (or if you want to be able to see the threats to liberty in order to be capable of striking a blow for it), this is a thesis you that should reject. [End Page 227]

Fourth, even if conspiracy theories are likely false, investigating them is key to motivating people to learn about history.

**Rogan 13** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

And in the end, history is clear: **Conspiracy theories serve the well-being of our country.** Consider Apollo 11. It's understandable that Buzz Aldrin doesn't enjoy accusations of being the 20th century's biggest liar. But he shouldn't worry. **Bogus theories that America faked the moon landing evoke such fascination that they lead to info**rmation **discovery**. As a result of conspiracy-fueled curiosity, each new class of 10th graders may discuss fluttering flags and secret film sites, but in the end, the desire to know leads to the great majority's acceptance of reality. And in that journey of discovery, **this amazing story of human adventure is renewed again** and again**. The conspiracy becomes the servant of history**. Or how about JFK conspiracy theorists? Yes, they've been debunked time and time again. However, **by stimulating an enduring** public **fascination with JFK, conspiracy theorists have** also **helped foster** a corollary **fascination for** the incredible political history of the 1960s. **Civil Rights, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam**… in some ways, conspiracy curiosity leads people to learn about America's history.

Fifth, prima facie rejection of conspiracy theories is academically dishonest. Conspiracy theorizing is key to genuine search for truth.

**Kennedy 13** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

There is much snobbish dismissal of so called ‘conspiracy theories’ from the scientific, political, academic & journalistic community. I argue that **conspiracy theories are a** valid & **necessary contribution to** the **discussion of certain events & deserve** just **as much credibility as** those of the **‘experts’**.I say this as someone who wholeheartedly subscribes to scientific methodology & sceptical thought as the best means of getting closest to the ‘truth’ of a subject – the need for solid evidence & rigorous testing being the process by which a ‘theory’ becomes an established fact (until proven otherwise). Another facet of that way of thinking is that the pursuit of truth must outweigh any emotional or personal attachment one might have for their ‘theory’ – if their beloved theory is proven to be undeniably incorrect, then the owner of that theory should gladfully dispense of it, in the pursuit of truth. Also, all theories should be treated (and tested) as equal. In light of these sceptical principles, I argue that many ‘conspiracy theories’ are perfectly in line with this spirit & that it is their **rebuffers** who **are** the ones **adhering to a blind belief system**. I can see no reason why a ‘conspiracy theory’ should not be treated with the same level of seriousness as any other theory. How arrogant it is of the self styled ‘know it all’s’ to guffaw & flippantly dismiss a ‘conspiracy theory’ as being absurd or impossible, just because it doesn’t fit their existing world view – that is totally out of step with the spirit of scepticism, scientific methodology, journalism & the pursuit of truth. I think that conspiracy theories bring a valid & defendable contribution to the debate & simply saying ‘oh what a bunch of crack pots’ whilst you smugly pat your ‘oh so clever’ self on the back, just shows not only an intellectual & sceptical flaw but also a questionable interest in the genuine pursuit of truth, no matter how uncomfortable that truth may be. Let us not forget that **all ‘facts’ begin as theories** & let us also not forget the **countless great people throughout history** that **were** once **ridiculed** (or tortured & killed) **for promoting ideas that we** all **take**n **as granted** today **– such as the earth not being flat!** I think that when it comes to subjects such as 9/11 & JFK, for example, the conspiracy theorists & the mainstream academic/scientific & journalistic community are on an equal grounds for credibility because **neither side really knows for SURE what actually happened – ALL parties are mere theorists** on these subjects **& the actual truth is only known by** the **people** who were **involved**. And this is where the cracks in the fibre of the **mainstream Scientific, academic & journalistic fields** start to show – they **end up falling back on ‘belief systems’** (the exact opposite of the values they profess to uphold), they start to utter things like ‘oh they never would have done that’ or ‘they never could have kept that a secret’ or ‘why would they want to do that’, ‘thats absurd’ etc etc. **They can’t argue with** the **conspiracy research because much of it is** actually **more thorough than their own**, so they have to just dismiss it as just being some kind of ‘youtube academia’ – as if that is a good enough response to questions they can’t answer. The reason they can’t argue with the research is because **most of these subjects involve secrecy &** when you don’t have full access to the tools of the experiment, **you are only left with your own judgment in joining the dots as best you can** – and this position is the same for BOTH sides of the debate. This is where pre-set belief systems rear their head & also a thing called ‘confirmation bias’ (where a person only see’s the things that confirm what they already think). If you believe that ‘they’re all bastards & are plotting against us’ then you’re only going to see the ‘facts’ that support that but also if you believe that ‘they never would have done that, there must be some other explanation’, you’re going to dismiss information that might be outside of your comfort zone. You might expect such things from layman journalism but not from professional, experienced researchers, scientists & academics. If they were able, like some kind of intellectual superman, to answer all of the ‘naive conspiracy buff’s’ questions with a definite & irrefutable explanation, then we’d all be able to join in the laughter at the preposterous notion of whatever ‘the conspiracy loons’ were saying. But they can’t, they merely laugh & say ‘oh, you’re so naive, how ridiculous, trot along little one’. I know that extreme claims require extreme evidence & it is in the hands of the theorist to bring supporting evidence – but many conspiracy theorists DO & their evidence & research has not actually be credibly refuted. I know it is difficult to disprove something when you don’t have access to all of the facts & again, in areas involving government secrecy etc, this is the main problem, but that is exactly my point, the **conspiracy debunkers have no more ‘special inside information’ than anyone else**, so they are merely drawing different ‘judgements’ from the scant info that IS available. Just **dismissing the NOTION of a conspiracy, is simply** just **expressing a belief system & is not the same as responding to the questions on an academic level**. Also, I am not saying that I necessarily ‘believe’ any of these conspiracy theories – it is not about belief – but as a sceptic, I give equal time to all opinions on a subject – rather than arrogantly dismissing those that don’t fit my existing world view. **Those that do that are not seeking truth**, they are seeking confirmation of what they already believe.

And sixth, stigma toward conspiracy theorizing leads individuals to self-limit the ways in which they can express themselves politically. **Husting 13** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

[Brackets in original.] Some of the best evidence for this is the rise of the disclaimer “I’m not a conspiracy theorist but…” which has become a regular feature in popular political culture (Husting and Orr 2006); a Google search for it in 2011 returns about 182,000 hits. As with most disclaimers, this one functions to distance the utterer from a category that can spoil not just the intended claim, but the personhood of the claimant as well. In Mary Douglas’s terms, such categories are dirty, or ritually polluted. **Disclaimers like “I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but…”** function to inoculate or **distance ourselves from that which can spoil our speech**/actions**, but also our personhood. Once conferred, the identity** permanently **removes us from the possibility of political speech and action, and** forms of **human becoming**/self-production. Fear of the accusation leads most of us come to govern our own thoughts and speech to ensure we are not so labeled. When we cannot avoid it, the result is shame, as Keller (2011b) illuminates in a recent anti-conspiracy theory article; “[Mark] Fenster, a law professor and author of ‘Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture,’ says a sense of conspiracy is ‘almost an instinctive response to strange events.’ ‘I admit I was a little drawn to the D.S.K. [Dominique Strauss-Kahn] plot at first,’ Fenster told me. ‘Then I heard Nina Totenberg explain the case on NPR, and I was ashamed of myself.” Fenster exhibits what most of us experience: shame at the possibility of fitting into the category. The affective politics of conspiracy discourse is such that **many of us— good governmentalized subjects—**continually **manage**, reflect on, and monitor **ourselves to ensure that we do not** come to **“fit the label.”** Bratich (2008, 140) highlights precisely the encouragement of this governmentalized strategy by the State Department in its online site “How to Identify Misinformation; ‘it is important to note the state’s preferred orientation of detection techniques: of the people by the people. Peer-to-peer suspicion…’ quickly identigies the dangerous theorist among us, but it also turns us into self-managers as we evaluate how far our thoughts are from conspiracy theorizing, and as we try to avoid being shamefully stuck with the condensed assemblage of the label. **Conspiracy panics fuse** not just **‘reason and politics in a way that promotes** the technology of **citizen subjectification’** but ‘emotion’ as well. ‘Both affect and reason must become part of the ethos of the self, a work of the self on the self…[panics] are not just about making people reasonable, but making reason [and, we add, contempt] a people’s enterprise” (Bratich 2008, 46).

Self-limiting of the perspectives from which one can think is part and parcel of ontological violence, undermining our ability to understand the self.

**Husting 13** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

Making possible this model of democratic political action are two qualities of life in public: natality and plurality. They are sine qua non for Arendtian agonistic democracy. **Life in public happens through plurality,** in which we are seen and heard by others in a context **where we can, through action and speech, affect material and symbolic conditions** (Arendt 1958, 57). Life in public arises whenever people engage each other through the agonistic confrontation of identities, opinions, and differences. Indeed, for Arendt the only way we can think for ourselves is through encounters with others, which transforms opinion into thought. Arendt argues that **thinking requires** a form of **“interior” plurality, in which we** use the dialogic process of **think**ing **from more than one perspective** (our own) to examine our beliefs and actions. As Gordon writes (2002, 137), Even one’s own identity, not only in the sense of what one is, but also who one is, is contingent upon how others interpret one’s words and deeds. Arendt goes so far as to suggest that even “the great forces of intimate life—the passions of the heart, the thought of the mind, the delights of the senses—lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. Notice here that Arendt deliberately allows room in public life for passion, delight, and emotionality in general, and these are tied to becoming human. **For Arendt being seen and heard by others is requisite** both **to construction of the world in common and** to **the self** interwoven with it. But natality shows us most clearly the damage done when conspiracy discourse catapults selves from the ongoing process of world-making in common. Natality, carrying as it does the resonances of birth and newness, is our capacity to continually re-construct and renegotiate our world in concert with others who are in political contest with us. **Through my ability to talk or act in new ways I create who I am**; I participate in what can only be a collective, if profoundly conflictual, process of crafting the world Arendt writes that The human being who has lost his place in a community, his political status in the struggle of his time, and the legal personality which makes his actions and part of his destiny a consistent whole is left with those qualities which usually can become articulate only in the sphere of private life and must remain unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern…mere existence…(Arendt 1951, 301). **To permanently exclude others from this process is to enact a form of violence that** in turn forecloses the spaces of democracy. It **erodes the condition of plurality, or** the **inclusion of maximal differences** in play **in world-making.**

Next is Theory Preempts

1. Evaluate theory through reasonability. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory, killing substantive education. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

2. Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

3. Err aff on theory. There was a 5% neg side bias at Strake Jesuit based on prelims and elims according to Joy of Tournaments. This also means presume aff if presumption matters.

4. I’m willing to clarify or alter my advocacy in cross-ex.

5. Err against debaters who don’t disclose. It gives me an infinite research burden which kills fairness and pre-round topic education.

6. Err towards small schools on theory to account for resource disparity that makes it harder for me to win.

7. Case outweighs theory. Theory excludes a plurality of perspectives by limiting the types of arguments we can run, which is ontologically violent. That’s Husting 13.

8. **Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

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